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Abstract
Beller, Bender, and Medin question the necessity of including social anthropology within the
cognitive sciences. We argue that there is great scope for fruitful rapprochement while agreeing that
there are obstacles (even if we might wish to debate some of those specifically identified by Beller
and colleagues). We frame the general problem differently, however: not in terms of the problem of
reconciling disciplines and research cultures, but rather in terms of the prospects for collaborative
deployment of expertise (methodological and theoretical) in problem-driven research. For the
purposes of illustration, our focus in this article is on the evolution of cooperation.
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1. Introduction
According to Beller and colleagues ‘‘the problems between anthropology and the other
cognitive science sub-disciplines … are deep—so deep in fact, that a separation, if not an
outright divorce, may be called for.’’ Presumably, however, this bleak conclusion is not
intended to encompass all research traditions in anthropology. Consider the case of cogni-
tive anthropology, a rather dowdy bride perhaps, preoccupied in her youth with matters of
limited consequence, such as the relativity of color terminology, kinship taxonomy, or spa-
tial cognition (D’Andrade, 1995). Cataloguing such variability was no doubt a respectable
pursuit, placing traditional cognitive anthropology in an obedient if somewhat lowly
position in the harem of the cognitive sciences. Clearly, the relations between academic
disciplines do not need to be marriages made in heaven in order to function well. Social or
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cultural anthropology is an older and more dominant partner. She may be stubborn, cantan-
kerous, and uncooperative but she commands bodies of knowledge that are needed to tackle
problems at the heart of the social, biological, and cognitive sciences. A good example is
the problem of explaining cooperation in large groups.
Cooperation has been shown to play a crucial role in the reproduction of genes, cells,
organisms, and groups of organisms, to the extent that it has even been described as the third
fundamental principle of evolution, alongside mutation and selection (Nowak, 2006).
Explaining how cooperation evolves has been a major focus in the biological sciences for
more than half a century, prompting some of the most influential concepts in evolutionary
thinking, including kin selection and the extended phenotype (Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton,
1964), reciprocity and altruism (Axelrod, 1984), and multilevel selection (Michod, 1999).
Some of these concepts are particularly important for understanding human psychology and
behavior and the evolution of cultural systems. Adapting Dobzhansky’s famous phrase, it
has recently been observed that nothing in psychology makes sense except in the light of
evolution (Bjorklund, 2011), but it could equally be said that nothing in social science
makes sense except in the light of cooperation.
Broadly we can distinguish two kinds of explanatory challenges with regard to coopera-
tion in human societies. First, there is the challenge of explaining the evolution of special-
ized cognitive architecture supporting cooperative behavior in our species. Experimental
psychologists and game theorists have made significant progress investigating the mecha-
nisms that underpin cooperation among individuals, such as prosocial and antisocial punish-
ment, social identification, fusion, social learning, empathizing, and coalitional thinking. All
these mechanisms evolved under natural selection when our ancestors hunted and foraged in
small, face-to-face groups. Second, there is the challenge of explaining the evolution of cul-
tural mechanisms supporting a diversity of forms of cooperation from generalized reciproc-
ity in hunter-gatherer bands to complex systems of top-down regulation in stratified states.
Such diversity constitutes the heartland of social anthropology’s subject matter.
Ethnographers have documented principles of cooperation at work in a wide range of
domains, including kinship, marriage and descent, legal institutions and political organiza-
tion, religious thinking and behavior, and techniques of production, consumption, and
exchange. This empirical wealth and the general questions that prompted its assembly consti-
tute an obvious starting point for scientifically rigorous investigation of the evolution of coop-
eration in human societies. No serious biologist would by choice launch an investigation into
the psychology and behavior of a new species based on its behavior in a cage or tank but
would instead begin with painstaking observation in a range of natural environments. We
would argue that anthropology should be to the cognitive sciences what fieldwork is to experi-
mental primatology. It is a starting point for the production of testable hypotheses.
2. The cognitive science of cooperation
The varieties of human cooperative behaviors that have been described and accounted for
by ethnographers, ecologists, and evolutionary biologists rely on a range of psychological
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mechanisms. Identifying and describing the skills and motivations that enable human coop-
eration is a core challenge for cognitive science, and distinct from explaining why and how
these mechanisms evolved. Here, we specifically focus on the importance of behavioral syn-
chrony as a causal mechanism enabling uniquely human cooperation and social bonding. As
with established themes in cooperation literature, such as kin selection and nepotism, and
reciprocity and exchange, this growing area of research has emerged from the interdisciplin-
ary engagement of anthropological, cognitive, and evolutionary scholarship.
In sociology and anthropology, group synchronous activity has long been recognized as
an integral and universal component of human social life (Kertzer, 1989). Dancing, singing,
chanting, drumming, and group music-making require careful coordination and synchrony
among participants, and they are often the focus of intense social events and experiences. In
his treatment of ritual, anthropologist Victor Turner developed the influential concept of
communitas to refer to the bond of ‘‘humankindness’’ among participants and its accompa-
nying affect (1969). Turner defined communitas metaphorically as ‘‘the ‘quick’ of human
relatedness,’’ evoking Emile Durkheim’s notion of ‘‘collective effervescence,’’ which also
described the intense feelings of bondedness and ‘‘moral unity’’ among participants in
sacred ritual (2001, p.175). For Durkheim and Turner, communal ritual activities could
serve to weaken the boundaries between self and the group, and generate a community sense
of ‘‘unprecedented potency.’’ Despite the influence of these concepts and insights on the
subsequent development of anthropological theory, their potential importance for explana-
tory accounts of human cooperation has remained obscure. How do ceremonies breed
‘‘moral unity,’’ if at all? What features engender a sense of community? Are these features
present beyond the religious or ritual domain?
Recently, the bonding effects of synchronous communal activity have received increasing
attention in the cognitive scientific literature on cooperation. Following Durkheim’s lead,
several researchers have explored the hypothesis that behavioral synchrony enhances social
cohesion and cooperation. Using standard behavioral economics measures, Wiltermuth and
Heath (2009) showed that coordinated synchronous walking or marching has a significant
positive effect on cooperation (compared to merely walking together). Hove and Risen
(2009) found that synchronous dyadic finger tapping had a significant positive influence on
subsequent affiliation ratings between participants (compared to non-synchronous tapping).
Developmental research suggests that the capacity for synchronous music-making to
enhance cooperation emerges early in childhood. Kirschner and Tomasello (2010), for
example, found that 4-year-old children were more likely spontaneously to provide instru-
mental help and cooperate in a problem-solving task with a partner after a performance
entailing coordinated synchrony.
Although this research has given some empirical weight to early theoretical speculations,
it is still not clear precisely how the synchrony mechanism works. How does synchronous
activity influence social cohesion and cooperation? Three distinct but potentially comple-
mentary mechanisms have been advanced.
1. Cohen, Ejsmond-Frey, Knight, and Dunbar (2010) stress the role of opioidergic activ-
ity in physical exercise, claiming that group synchronous exercise enhances endorphin
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activity and associated feelings of well-being. Compared to solo rowing, they found
that synchronized group rowing significantly heightened pain threshold (an indirect
measure of endorphin release), providing support for the hypothesis that the feel-good
release of endorphins underpins the positive influence of synchrony on social bonding
and cooperation, including participants’ willingness to behave altruistically.
2. Hove and Risen (2009) and Miles, Nind, Henderson, and Macrae (2010) consider an
interpretation in terms of self-other representation. In highly synchronous activity, per-
ceptions of self- versus other-produced action closely overlap. This effectively blurs
the self-other distinction, potentially heightening feelings of closeness and mutual
understanding. Positive views of self extend to the other, thus enhancing affiliation.
3. Kirschner and Tomasello (2010) emphasize the importance of collective intentions
and shared goals in the generation of coordinated, synchronous activity and subsequent
altruistic and cooperative behavior among participants. The high level of coordination
and constant audio-visual representation of the collective intention and goal to vocal-
ize or move together strengthens participants’ sense that they are acting together as a
unit.
Some theorists have proposed that the synchrony effect, however it works, potentially
accounts for the widespread appeal and incidence of cultural rituals involving synchronous
activity such as singing, dancing, marching, and drumming. Nevertheless, many such issues
at anthropology’s heartland remain largely unexplored. Future cognitive scientific research
on ritualized synchrony––its cross-cultural incidence, the cultural (and biological) evolution
of mechanisms permitting and promoting it, and its purported social bonding function
within groups (as well as its potential, in turn, to contribute to hostility and conflict between
groups)––will necessarily require systematic scrutiny of the ethnographic record and the
generation of relevant new ethnographic data. For the problem of synchrony, and
the problem of cooperation more generally, continued collaboration among experts across
the biological, cognitive, and social sciences––including anthropology––will be necessary
for further progress in answering critical questions about ultimate purposes and proximate
mechanisms.
3. The cultural evolution of cooperation
Until the start of the Holocene, the limits of human cooperation ran to hundreds of indi-
viduals and rarely more than a thousand. And yet nowadays most of the world’s population
is enfolded into coalitions that command allegiance from millions of individuals governed
by the holders of permanent offices according to codified rules applying within and across
numerous levels of jurisdictional hierarchy. In this section, we ask how the scale and struc-
ture of human cooperation crossed the evolutionary threshold separating small egalitarian
bands from large-scale systems of top-down control.
As noted in Section 2, rituals can help to bind people together and promote cooperation.
Anthropologists have long observed, however, that there are two main kinds of group
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cohesion: the one small-scale uniting face-to-face communities and the other large-scale
uniting ‘‘imagined communities’’ (Whitehouse, 1995). The theory of modes of religiosity
(hereafter ‘‘the modes theory’’) proposes that these divergent patterns of group formation
are a consequence of the frequency and emotionality of ritual performances (Whitehouse,
1995, 2000, 2004). According to this theory, low-frequency, dysphorically arousing rituals
(e.g., painful or frightening initiation rituals) generate intense cohesion in small groups
through the activation of a series of closely related psychological mechanisms summarized
below. This syndrome, prevalent in many small-scale societies and local cults, is labeled the
‘‘imagistic mode’’ on account of the fact that participants reflect on their ritual ordeals,
producing a wealth of imagery and interpretation. By contrast, high-frequency, low-arousal
rituals sustain standardized bodies of teaching and practice efficiently spread across large
populations, enabling the establishment of large group identities and the emergence of
priestly hierarchies. This syndrome, prevalent in the world religions and many large regional
movements, is labeled the ‘‘doctrinal mode’’ because of its emphasis on the maintenance of
doctrinal orthodoxy.
One of the core predictions of the modes theory is that the lowest frequency rituals will
typically involve the highest levels of dysphoric arousal and that high-frequency rituals will
seldom entail high levels of dysphoria. Initial efforts to test the modes theory against a range
of case studies presented by ethnographers and historians (Whitehouse & Martin, 2004).
But these case studies were not randomly selected. To avoid the risk of ‘‘cherry picking,’’
an ethnographic database of 644 rituals taken from a sample of 74 language groups was con-
structed using evidence stored in the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF: a large collection
of ethnographic writings). For each ritual nearly 100 variables were recorded as present,
absent, or not reported or coded on a scale from 1 to 5. The database included details of the
scale and structure of ritual communities and various aspects of ritual frequency and emo-
tional arousal. Also included were numerous other variables relating to more detailed pre-
dictions of the modes theory. It was possible to construct such a detailed database only
because ethnographers had gone to the trouble of documenting the features of interest at
least partly as a consequence of theoretical frameworks summarized in Section 2. Here we
report just a few of our findings (from Atkinson & Whitehouse, 2010).
Fig. 1 shows that frequency and arousal are inversely correlated, as predicted by the modes
theory. More specifically, it reveals that in the lowest frequency rituals dysphoric arousal
rises in intensity, whereas euphoric arousal peaks around annual frequency. Moreover, the
heat maps in Fig. 2 reveal that this is not simply an inverse correlation between frequency and
arousal since there is a heavy clustering of low-arousal rituals at the high-frequency end and
of dysphoric rituals at the low-frequency end of the spectrum. This is consistent with the idea
that doctrinal and imagistic modes are best understood as divergent attractor positions rather
than a continuum of possibilities. Importantly, this study revealed that groups with high-fre-
quency ⁄ low-arousal rituals tend to be much larger than groups with low-frequency ⁄dysphoric
rituals. Moreover, a significant correlation was found between high-frequency ritual and the
presence of agriculture even controlling for the effects of world religions. This suggests that
the transition from foraging to farming may have been accompanied by an increase in the
pace of ritual life and thus a shift from imagistic to doctrinal dynamics.
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To investigate further this last possibility requires close scrutiny of the archeological evi-
dence (Johnson, 2004; Mithen, 2004; Whitehouse & Hodder, 2010). Preliminary studies at
one site of first emergence of crop cultivation and animal domestication, the Neolithic exca-
vations at Catalhoyuk (Central Anatolia, Turkey), shows evidence of low-frequency feasting
events in the faunal remains and wall paintings suggest that these feasts involved elaborate
and dangerous rituals which included the baiting of very large wild animals. By the end of
the period of settlement, however, these practices appear to have largely died out. Hunting
is gradually replaced by farming, and much larger communities encompassing thousands of
individuals emerge along with more discursive forms of religiosity. Thus, initial indications
suggest there was indeed a shift from imagistic to doctrinal modes of religiosity
(Whitehouse & Hodder, 2010). To test these claims more systematically, many thousands of
(A)
(B)
Fig. 1. A: Arousal scores by ritual frequency (rho = 0.401, n = 644, p < .001). B: Arousal scores by ritual fre-
quency for euphoric (green; rho = 0.08, n = 644, p < .05) and dysphoric (blue; rho = 0.409, n = 644, p < .001)
arousal (from Atkinson & Whitehouse, 2010).
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findings at Catalhoyuk are currently being recoded using the same format as our HRAF
database so that we will be able to analyze the relationship between ritual frequency and
arousal and changing group morphology over nearly 2,000 years of settlement at the site.
Statistical methods of this kind can provide a detailed picture of the correlates of target
variables, such as different scales of coalition formation and intensities of group cohesion.
But correlations are not the same as causes. To disambiguate the psychological mecha-
nisms that give rise to these patterns requires carefully controlled experiments. Efforts to
test the predictions of the modes theory experimentally have focused on the causal opacity
of ritual (the absence of a knowable physical-causal relationship between procedures and
end-goals) and the effects of this on exegetical innovation and transmission, which are
thought to be mediated by emotional arousal. Of particular note, recent studies with young
children at the University of Texas at Austin have shown an early developing propensity
to imitate causally opaque procedures with greater rigidity, and to be less inclined to inno-
vate, when end-goals are lacking (Legare and Whitehouse, unpublished data). Readiness to
learn behaviors that have no rational causal structure facilitates the spread of rituals,
socially prescribed procedures that signal group identity without necessarily effecting
changes in the physical environment. Experimental manipulation of emotional arousal dur-
ing the performance of causally opaque actions has meanwhile been shown to moderate
the volume and specificity of subsequent reflection on the meanings of the actions, which
is thought to affect the intensity of in-group cohesion (Richert, Whitehouse, & Stewart,
2005). A 5 year program of research on the modes theory starting in June 2011 is building
on these findings through more systematic studies of the cognitive underpinnings and
social consequences of ritual by combining qualitative anthropological studies with psy-
chological experiments, quantitative surveys, and computational modeling techniques
(http://www.cam.ox.ac.uk/ritual/). This kind of cross-disciplinary research spans the cogni-
tive and evolutionary sciences but originates in observations and theoretical speculations
from social and cultural anthropology.
(B)(A)
Fig. 2. Heat map of dysphoric (A) and euphoric (B) arousal score versus ritual frequency (n = 644) (from Atkin-
son & Whitehouse, 2010).
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4. Concluding remarks
It has recently been argued that the cognitive and behavioral sciences have been too cava-
lier in seeking to generalize to humanity results of studies conducted mainly with Western,
educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (‘‘Weird’’) societies, which are ‘‘among the
least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans’’ (Henrich,
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). If the problem were merely one of sampling, then it could be
solved by more extensive replication of experiments in a greater diversity of human popula-
tions (Medin, Bennis, & Chandler, 2010). But the problem goes deeper than that. Research
agendas and the specific experimental designs to which they give rise are also shaped by the
historically contingent assumptions and priorities of ‘‘Weird’’ societies. To take a general
example, much developmental psychology likes to imagine children as little scientists, curi-
ously exploring the physical affordances and causal structure of their environments by
means of hypothesis testing (Gopnik, 2000). This perspective on its trajectory could readily
be traced through the influential work of Jean Piaget and his intellectual heirs. But how
would human development look from the perspective of more traditional cultures? Rapid
technological innovation and scientific advance is a very modern phenomenon and social
organization and cultural transmission in much of the world remains highly repetitive and
tradition bound. Taking that latter perspective on social learning as our starting point would
no doubt produce rather different research agendas in developmental psychology (White-
house, 2011). While cross-cultural psychology can help to address the ‘‘Weird’’ sampling
issue, it offers no substitute for systematic documentation of variation in cultural systems.
Using the problem of explaining cooperation as our principal example, we have made a case
that ethnographic observation has a vital role to play in the formulation of research ques-
tions and agendas in the cognitive and behavioral sciences. Insofar as ethnography remains
the principal method of social and cultural anthropology, exclusion of that discipline from
the scientific study of our species would be a grave mistake.
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